At CHES 2000, Schindler introduced a timing attack that enables the factorization of an RSA-modulus if RSA implementations use the Chinese Remainder Theorem and Montgomery multiplication. In this paper we introduce another approach for deriving the secret prime factor by focusing on the conditional branch Schindler used in his attack. One of the countermeasures against Schindler's attack is the blinding method. If input data are blinded with a fixed value or short-period random numbers, Schindler's attack does not work but our method can still factorize the RSAmodulus.
Introduction
Recently the threats of side-channel attacks have been increasing. Therefore, research into the attacks and countermeasures is being carried out actively. In side-channel attacks, leaked information as well as input data/output data are analyzed and secret information is derived from them. The attacks are classified roughly into three types: "Timing Attack" [3] , "Simple Power Analysis (SPA)" [4] , and "Differential Power Analysis (DPA)" [4] . The method proposed in this paper uses leaked information from SPA.
The decryption process of RSA is often implemented with the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) and Montgomery multiplication [2] to calculate exponentiation efficiently. It is known that each input data has different processing time because a subtraction is carried out or not depending on the conditional branch in the Montgomery multiplication [7] . Schindler focused on this point in the RSA-CRT implementation and introduced a timing attack that can derive a secret key [1] .
Schindler showed several countermeasures against his attack. One of them is the blinding method. When c d mod N is processed using this method, we multiply an input c by a random number r, execute exponentiation (rc) d mod N, and remove the effect of the random number, multiplying by r −d mod N, after decryption of RSA. It seems that the blinding method can work as the countermeasure against Schindler's attack even if the random number used in blinding is fixed.
In this paper, we focus our attention on the same conditional branch as Schindler's attack, and introduce another approach for deriving the secret key against RSA implementation with CRT and Montgomery multiplication. Our method can work not only in the case without blinding countermeasure but also in the case that blinding countermeasure with a fixed value or short-period random numbers is implemented. Moreover, we confirm the effectiveness of our method with a simple simulation. In a typical case of 1024 bit RSA modulus, our method requires 1025 RSA-CRT executions, and it is reduced to 514 executions in the case of no blinding.
Our attack is an extended timing attack combined with SPA. Similarly categorized attacks, combined timing and power analysis, are proposed by Walter-Thompson [8] and Schindler [9] . The differences between our attack and these attacks are described in Sect. 6.
Implementation of Exponentiation
We describe an implementation algorithm of RSA that is the target of SPA discussed in this paper. Generally, exponentiation is calculated by repeating multiplication and square using the binary method. Montgomery multiplication is known as a method which can calculate exponentiation effectively. Therefore, this method is used in many implementations. Montgomery multiplication, exponentiation using Montgomery multiplication, and decryption algorithm of RSA using CRT are shown below.
Montgomery Multiplication
Montgomery multiplication, an algorithm which outputs w = xyR −1 mod n for input of x, y, n, (x, y ≤ n), was introduced by Montgomery in 1985 [2] . The algorithm is shown in Fig. 1 , where the bit length of the modulus n is denoted by |n|, and 2 |n| is generally used as the Montgomery constant R. The subtraction w = w − n is occasionally carried out at the conditional branch in the final step. Therefore each input data has different processing time of Montgomery multiplication, and it becomes a target of timing attack. input : x, y, n output : executed under the condition that there are time differences due to FSs.
Exponentiation with Montgomery Multiplication
The exponentiation algorithm based on the binary method, a general calculation method of exponentiation, with Montgomery multiplication is shown in Fig. 2 .
This algorithm outputs z = c d mod n for input c, n, d, (2) and d k−1 = 1.
Decryption of RSA with CRT
Exponentiation with CRT is generally known as a speeding up method in the decryption of RSA. Let us suppose that p, q are primes, d is a secret exponent, and
. The algorithm is shown in Fig. 3 .
Schindler's Timing Attack
Now we describe a method of timing attack introduced by Schindler [1] . Schindler's attack is based on the observation of the following characteristics.
In Montgomery multiplication xBR −1 mod p, where B is randomly taken from Z p , the probability that FS occurs is given as follows:
The same equation is obtained for the modulus q. Hence, processing time of exponentiation for input c,
is shown in Fig. 4 , where the horizontal axis is u (= cR mod N). This graph shows characteristics such that t increases linearly but has steps at multiples of the primes p, q. These characteristics result from the fact that the number of FSs depends on input data. Schindler measured processing time of an exponentiation with c (= uR −1 mod N) as input data. He introduced the method which identifies the modulus p or q using the measured processing time. First, an attacker searches a pair of input data which causes a large difference of processing time such as u 1 and u 2 in Fig. 4 . Next, he calculates an intermediate value u 3 of the two input data u 1 and u 2 . Then, he chooses u 2 and u 3 which show a larger difference of processing time than u 1 and u 3 . He repeats dividing the selected input data until a multiple of the modulus p or q is determined.
One of the countermeasures against this attack is a blinding method which randomizes the input c. When c d mod N is processed using this method, we multiply c by a random number r, execute exponentiation (rc) d mod N, and remove the effect of the random number, multiplying by r −d mod N. If the blinding method is implemented, the linear characteristics for p and q shown in Fig. 4 cannot be seen, and it is expected that steps at multiples of p and q are not observed clearly. Therefore, Schindler's attack cannot derive the secret key any more.
Our Attacking Method
The blinding method is proposed as a countermeasure against Schindler's attack. Although a random number is required for this countermeasure, the quality of the random number and its effect on the countermeasure is not fully analyzed. In this paper, we assume the implementation where the random number for blinding is a fixed value or taken from short-period pseudorandom numbers. It should be noted that Schindler's attack is invalid even if the random number for the blinding is a fixed value. This paper shows a concrete method which is valid if a fixed unknown value or short-period random numbers are used for the blinding. Our attack is SPA using the same characteristic caused by the conditional branch of FS. Thus, our attack is an extension of Schindler's attack, but the concrete approach of deriving the secret key is entirely different from his attack.
Assumptions
We describe the assumptions of our method.
1. The public key(N, e) of RSA is known to the attacker. 2. The attacker can input arbitrary ciphertexts chosen in advance. 3. The attacker can determine (FS ) p for each RSA decryption. In order to determine (FS ) p , a practical method is to observe power consumption traces. 4. Input c (= uR −1 mod N) is blinded by a random number r before RSA, and r is unknown to the attacker.
The attacker can guess the Montgomery constant R,
where we assume R = 2 |p| = 2 |q| .
In the following, our attack is described in the case that (FS ) p is applied, but it is also effective using the timing information of exponentiation with modulus p since such timing information is proportional to (FS ) p . Accordingly, the assumption 3 can be changed to using the processing time of exponentiation of modulus p. Since observing the power consumption traces is a concrete procedure to get such partial timing information, our attack is an extended timing attack combined with power consumption analysis. Now, we describe the difference of the assumptions between Schindler's attack [1] and our method. Our method is a non-adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack, whereas Schindler's attack is an adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack that adaptively changes input data after observation of processing time for each input data. Our method needs to get (FS ) p (or a part of timing information) in RSA decryption process, whereas Schindler's attack only needs to observe processing time of the whole process.
Two related approaches, which concern combined timing and power attack, have been proposed in [8] , [9] . A comparison with these attacks is described in Sect. 6.
Principles and Procedures
In this subsection, in order to explain a basic procedure of our method, we consider the case in which input data are blinded by an unknown number r. It should be noted that r is a fixed value.
Step1. Count (FS ) p : • Input c i = 
It should be noted that n max and n min are not the theoretical values of max( (FS) p ) nor min( (FS) p ) but measured values from k+1 RSA executions. Therefore, the above (3) is an approximation. In the following, the fixed number r is considered as r < p, since the effective blinding factor is r mod p during the exponentiation with modulus p.
Step2. Calculate
where β th = 0.5. Now, we define α = r/p and represent α by
Then, we consider the calculation procedure of r ÷ p as shown in Fig. 6 . β 0 is 0, since r < p. β 1 is given by
and the residue, after β 1 is determined, will be 2r − pβ 1 = 2r mod p. If the same calculation is carried over as mentioned above, the following relation is derived about β i : 
From (6), we obtain
β i can be approximated byβ i as the following using the basic characteristics of (3):
When we determine
we can get an approximate value of β i .
Step3. Calculate
Using β i (i = 0, · · · , k), we approximate α by
Step4. Derive q from the calculation q = gcd ( α k N , N) .
Note that the α k , which is the approximate value of α, satisfies the following inequality,
From (10), we obtain
Consequently, we obtain
If N is 1024 bits, k = 1024. Therefore, we can attack with (|N|+1) measurements of (FS ) p when r is a fixed value.
Case of Blinding with Short-Period Pseudorandom Numbers
In this section, we consider an extension of the basic procedure to the case where blinding factor r is taken from shortperiod pseudorandom numbers. In this case, the attack can also be successful. Once the period of pseudorandom number is identified, we can easily apply the above-mentioned basic procedure. The period of pseudorandom numbers is expected to be identified by monitoring the variation in processing time with the same input data. If the period of the pseudorandom number is T , the attacker must execute the decryption of RSA T (|N| + 1)-times. If the period T is adequately long, our method is unrealistic because of the number of executions.
Case of No Blinding
Another extension of the basic procedure is studied in this section. We consider the case where the blinding countermeasure is not implemented. Since this case corresponds to the blinding factor r = 1, the basic attacking procedure is also successful for the same cost as in Sect. 4.2. However, about half of the measurements are meaningless, since we know the β i s (i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , |p| − 1) are always 0. We can improve the attacking cost by selecting an appropriate blinding factor r and multiplying the input c i by r in advance. The appropriate value of r is 2 |p|−1 , and the concrete attacking procedure is shown below.
We input
and search the approximate value α k , which is α − 
If
Consequently, we can derive the secret key when we observe the RSA decryption process |q| + 2times. If the countermeasure of blinding is not implemented, the number of measurements for a successful attack is about half of that in the case of blinding with a fixed value.
Simulation
In order to verify the effectiveness of our method, we analyzed a software implementation. Here we consider the case of blinding with a fixed number as described in Sect. 4.2. Step.1 Fig. 7 . The characteristics described in Sect. 3 are not shown and we ascertain that Schindler's attack is ineffective because input data are multiplied by an unknown number. If one knows the secret information r and p, one can transform Fig. 7 into Fig. 8 which clearly shows the linear characteristics between ru mod p and (FS ) p . However, it should be noted that Fig. 8 is unavailable in actual attacks, because it requires the secret information r and p.
Step. 2 We calculatedβ i from the result of measurement using (8) . From Fig. 9 , we can confirm thatβ i are distributed around 0 and 1. We divided this distribution into two groups, β i = 0 (whenβ i < β th ) and β i = 1 (whenβ i ≥ β th ), by using β th = 0.5 as a threshold.
Step.3, 4 We calculated α k from β i obtained using (10) , and could successfully derive q by
Consequently, we verified that we can derive the secret key with (FS ) p and public information only. The proposed method can attack RSA implementations even if input data are blinded with a fixed value or short-period random numbers.
Comparison with Other Related Attacks
In this section, the differences between our attack and two related attacks [8] , [9] are summarized. The attack in [9] is an improvement of the attack in [8] , and reduced the cost of a successful attack. Our attack and Schindler's timing attack [1] are designed to search for a multiple of prime factor p or q using the timing variance while changing the inputs. The attacks in [8] , [9] are designed to determine the secret exponent using the difference in probability of FS in squarings and multiplications with exponentiation table entry.
In regard to the assumptions for successful attack, the methods in [8] , [9] use the location of FSs during the exponentiation with modulus p, whereas our attack uses only the total number of FSs. In order to exploit such timing information, all these attacks need power analysis.
In regard to the target RSA implementations, our attack breaks fixed blinding or no blinding countermeasure implemented using CRT with square and multiply exponentiation. The attacks in [8] , [9] further break the non-fixed blinding countermeasure implemented using CRT and non-CRT with table-based exponentiation † . According to the description in [9] , the required number of RSA executions is † When the target is implemented with square-and-multiplyalways exponentiation, which is an SPA countermeasure described in [11] , the effectiveness of the attacks in [8] , [9] is unclear. Our attack and Schindler's timing attack [1] are effective in that case. less than for our method. By applying the same technique in [1] , the cost for our attack also seems to be reducible using Coppersmith's algorithm [10] , but detailed analysis is to be studied.
Countermeasures
Since our attack is an extension of Schindler's timing attack, most of the countermeasures against Schindler's attack are effective. An obvious countermeasure against our method is to use long-period random number for blinding. If the period is adequately long, our method becomes unrealistic because of the required number of RSA executions. If the period of the random number is T , the attacker must execute the decryption of RSA T (|N| + 1)-times.
Another countermeasure is to add dummy operations to eliminate the differences caused by FS. Schindler also mentioned this countermeasure in his paper [1] . Our method uses leaked information observed as the power consumption or timing differences at the FSs. If there are no differences between original FSs and dummy FSs, our method is invalid even in the case of no blinding. But it should be noted that it may not be easy to implement Montgomery multiplication as there are no differences in the power consumption waveform between the original FSs and the dummy FSs.
Another valid countermeasure is to use R which is sufficiently large. This can eliminate the conditional branch of FS. Several papers discuss about this method [5] , [6] .
Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced an extension of Schindler's timing attack against RSA implementation with CRT and Montgomery multiplication. Our attack requires the number of FSs or the processing time during exponentiation with modulus p, and assumes that the leaked information is obtainable using the power consumption traces, i.e. SPA. The attack is classified as a non-adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack, which is a class different to that of Schindler's attack. This method is valid against the countermeasure in which input data are blinded with a fixed value or short-period random numbers. Though this method uses the same conditional branch as Schindler's attack, the approach of deriving the secret key is entirely different from his attack. Furthermore, in order to prove the effectiveness of our method, we showed the software simulation result.
An outstanding problem is whether our method can be extended to a pure timing attack, where the leaked information is processing time of the whole RSA decryption.
